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ABSTRACT
Systems that give control of a mobile robot to a remote user
raise privacy concerns about what the remote user can see
and do through the robot. We aim to preserve some of that
privacy by manipulating the video data that the remote user
sees. Through two user studies, we explore the effectiveness
of different video manipulation techniques at providing dif-
ferent types of privacy. We simultaneously examine task per-
formance in the presence of privacy protection. In the first
study, participants were asked to watch a video captured by
a robot exploring an office environment and to complete a
series of observational tasks under differing video manipula-
tion conditions. Our results show that using manipulations
of the video stream can lead to fewer privacy violations for
different privacy types. Through a second user study, it was
demonstrated that these privacy-protecting techniques were
effective without diminishing the task performance of the
remote user.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.2 [Information Interfaces and Presentation]: User
Interfaces—evaluation/methodology ; I.2.9 [Artificial Intel-
ligence]: Robotics—operator interfaces; I.4.3 [Image Pro-
cessing and Computer Vision]: Enhancement—filtering
General Terms
Design, Experimentation, Human factors
Keywords
Privacy interfaces, remote presence systems, video manipu-
lation
1. INTRODUCTION
What makes a mobile remote presence system more of a
privacy concern than, say a Skype connection? The main
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Figure 1: Unfiltered video compared to best filter
techniques based on desired privacy type. A replace
filter is applied to two laptops so that the user“Can’t
tell” they are there (a). A redact filter is used so that
the user“Can’t observe”anything in the hallway (b).
A blur filter is placed over two books so that a user
“Can’t discern” their titles (c).
difference is a shift in control. If you do not want some-
one to see you in the shower over Skype, then you do not
take your laptop into the bathroom. You have control over
what the user on the other end sees. However, with mobile
remote presence systems, the remote user can pilot the sys-
tem around the world, giving them control over what they
see.
For the purposes of this paper, we define a remote presence
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system (RPS) to be a system that allows a remote operator
to be virtually present in another location, and to interact
with the people and things there. The telephone and Skype
are two common examples of such systems. However, the
focus of the work in this paper is on systems that go beyond
just observing their environment, but also allow the user to
act in, and on it. The canonical example of such a system is
the Personal Roving Presence (PRoP) project [28], a mobile
robot base mounting an LCD screen, camera, and speaker
on a human-height pole. The robot wandered around the
UC Berkeley campus and surrounding areas under the con-
trol of a remote operator, allowing the operator to interact
with people the robot encountered. A decade later, similar
systems are becoming commercially available, including the
Beam [3], VGo [4], and InTouch RP-VITA [1]. The carica-
ture of these systems is that they are “Skype on a stick”: a
traditional video-conference interaction where the user has
some control over the physical location of the system.
These mobile systems introduce new privacy concerns.
With a passive teleconference system, the remote partici-
pant can only look at what the proximal participant points
the camera at. On mobile systems, the remote operator can
now point the camera themselves, taking control of privacy
away from the proximal user.
One method of preserving the privacy of the proximal user
is to alter the visual data that the remote operator sees. The
central question that we investigate in this paper is: What
methods of video stream manipulation are most effective at
ensuring a given privacy type without diminishing operator
performance? Our specific contributions are listed below.
Contributions.
1. Define different types of privacy based on what can be
observed (Can’t tell, Can’t observe, Can’t discern).
2. Perform a user study to determine which video ma-
nipulation techniques (redact, blur, replace, abstract)
works best for a given privacy type.
3. Demonstrate that the remote user can still perform
tasks with the privacy video manipulations in place.
Overview.
We first define the privacy types and video manipulation
techniques and summarize related work. Section 2 describes
our first user study examining the effectiveness of video ma-
nipulation techniques at ensuring different privacy types. A
second study that investigates the impact of these privacy-
protecting measures on task performance is presented in Sec-
tion 3. Section 5 concludes with a brief review of the two
studies and their key results.
1.1 Observational Privacy Types
We define a privacy type to be a specific restriction on the
capabilities of the remote presence system. The capabilities
can either be physical, where the system is prevented from
taking some action (the RPS cannot enter/leave some area
or touch some object), or observational, where the sensor
data transmitted to the remote user are censored in some
way.Sensor data can be both visual or auditory, but we
limit our scope to visual data due to the robot we are using.
In this paper, we focus on techniques for ensuring different
types of observational privacy as related to the video stream,
since this is both the most challenging sensor modality and
also the one most likely to violate privacy.
Defined Privacy Types.
We consider implementations for three types of observa-
tional privacy: “Can’t tell”, “Can’t discern”, and “Can’t ob-
serve.” We frame these as restrictions on the remote user,
rather than on the RPS itself. The RPS has unrestricted
access to the data from its sensors, but only passes on a
modified version of these data to the remote user.
1. Can’t tell. The expectation is that the remote oper-
ator cannot tell if a particular object is there or not.
Examples include: Not noticing any items exist on a
table, unable to tell that there is a person present in
the room.
2. Can’t observe. The expectation is that the remote
operator might be able to tell there is something there,
but cannot directly perceive it. Examples include: Not
being able to look into a certain room, not being able
to identify a shape as a person, or not showing what
types of objects are on a table.
3. Can’t discern. The expectation is that the remote
operator can tell that there is something there and can
identify the class of the object, but not the particular
instance. Examples include: Unable to read the text
of documents on the table, unable to make out facial
features, and unable to make out details of pictures on
the walls.
1.2 Video Manipulation Techniques
In order to preserve privacy we need to alter the visual
data the operator is seeing. There are a variety of methods
for doing so, many of which arise from the field of non-
photorealistic or artistic rendering. We discuss related work
in that area here, and then we list the specific techniques
that we evaluate for privacy protection in this paper.
Broadly speaking, we classify manipulation of images and
video by how they change the image: blur, inpainting, ab-
straction, line drawings, and painterly rendering. Blurring is
a straightforward image filter and is commonly used in TV
to obscure people’s faces. Inpainting [5, 8, 12, 21, 37, 38]
allows for filling an area of an image with synthesized con-
tent that is ideally indistinguishable from its environment.
Abstraction, also sometimes called image stylization [23, 41,
25, 40, 11], is similar to blurring, in that details are elided,
but it differs in that strong edges are preserved. It can also
involve restricting the color palate to create a cartoon-like
effect. Since these are essentially texture filters, most meth-
ods can be efficiently implemented on a GPU [42, 44]. Line
drawings [10, 32, 15, 18, 19] similarly preserve edges, but
eliminate color information and render the result as a pen
and ink or pencil-style sketch (sometimes with shading rep-
resented as hatching [36]). Painterly rendering techniques
try to mimic a particular style, such as pixelation [17], oil or
watercolors [24, 27, 43, 31] and comic-style [33]. Although
not always intentional, most of these techniques also result
in some image simplification or loss of detail, especially with
large brush sizes.
One primary concern when working with video or a mov-
ing camera is that the image can flicker because the lines and
(e)
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Figure 2: Video manipulation techniques. Left: The original image is shown with the two book titles to be
filtered highlighted in red (a). Right: Four different video manipulation techniques are applied to the book
titles — Blur (b), Control (c), Abstract (d), Redact (e), and Replace (f).
strokes change over time. There are several methods for ad-
dressing this [32, 24], with the primary approach being to
evolve the current stylization to the next frame, rather than
starting from scratch.
Defined Video Manipulations.
For our initial study we have chosen four basic video ma-
nipulation techniques to evaluate with respect to their ef-
fectiveness at providing different types of observational pri-
vacy (see Figure 2). We will refer to them as redact, blur,
replace, and abstract. These were chosen because they are
representative of the different classes of techniques that we
might apply to protect privacy, implementations were read-
ily available, and they can be efficiently implemented on a
GPU to achieve interactive rates.
1. Redact. We hide something by removing it from the
video stream, i.e., blacking it out.
2. Blur. We obscure a specified portion of the video data
by applying a Gaussian blur.
3. Replace. We replace an object with color data from
its surrounding environment (in-painting).
4. Abstract. We abstract a portion of the video by ap-
plying a combination of bilateral and meanshift filter-
ing.
1.3 Video Manipulation and Privacy
Various studies have looked into how using video manip-
ulations may help uphold privacy. Specifically, privacy typ-
ically considers autonomy, confidentiality, and solitude [7].
Filtering out parts of an image through marker detection has
been shown to effectively uphold privacy for video surveil-
lance cameras [34]. With an always-on camera space, using
a blur filter has been shown to better balance protecting
one’s privacy while still allowing sufficient awareness to the
user, so that any necessary and relevant information may
still be gleaned from the image both with a co-present me-
dia space [22] and a telepresent media space [6]. However, in
some circumstances where the privacy concerns are greater
(i.e. assistive monitoring through use of a fixed always-on
camera), a blur filter may not be sufficient, and another
technique such as redact may work more effectively [14].
In our study we examine which video manipulation tech-
niques work best for the three different privacy types we
have defined in this section, while still allowing the user to
complete a given task. Although research has been done
on the effects of using video manipulations to uphold pri-
vacy, these studies have been conducted for use in video
media spaces that have a fixed camera. In our study, we in-
vestigate to what degree these video manipulations uphold
privacy when the camera is capable of traversing around a
room and examining objects from different angles of view.
1.4 VideoManipulation and Task Performance
Several studies have looked at the effect of abstraction or
image simplification on task performance, perception, and
affect. In general, abstraction tends to speed up object
recognition and visual search tasks [19, 30, 16]. However,
there is evidence that increased abstraction can lead to less
accurate predictions of shape [16, 39, 30, 35] and a reduced
emotional or believability response [13, 20, 35, 26]. There is
also evidence that people routinely underestimate distances
in virtual environments, and that abstraction can exacer-
bate this [18, 29]. Selective abstraction is also effective at
focusing a viewer on the image point of interest by eliding
detail in unimportant areas of the image [9].
1.5 Hypotheses
In the studies presented in this paper, our goal is to de-
termine which methods of video manipulation are most ef-
fective at ensuring different types of observational privacy
without interfering with task performance. To evaluate the
video manipulation techniques, we test the following specific
hypotheses:
H1. Based on the desired privacy type, selected video ma-
nipulation techniques lead to fewer violations of pri-
vacy expectations.
H2. Using the privacy video manipulation technique does
not lead to a lowered task performance.
2. VIDEO MANIPULATON STUDY
In this study we tested how well the different video ma-
nipulation techniques worked for each of the different pri-
vacy types, using three different scenarios. To avoid issues
with localization, tracking, and training users to drive the
robot, we conducted this study with videos captured from
the robot’s camera.
2.1 Method
Participants were asked to watch three short video clips
that were captured by a robot exploring an office environ-
ment, and to respond to five questions asking them to iden-
tify objects within the environment. Each scene had a spe-
cific privacy type applied to it, and participants viewed one
clip of each scene. Each clip had one of the five randomly
assigned video manipulations applied to it.
2.1.1 Participants
140 participants were recruited through Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk. Participants were compensated between 20
and 40¢ for their participation. Participants were told that
they would be expected to“watch a clip from the perspective
of a robot investigating an office and answer 5 short ques-
tions.” The average time spent per participant was between
3-5 minutes.
2.1.2 Procedure
Participants were given the following prompt:
A mobile robot has explored an office environ-
ment for you and acquired the videos on the fol-
lowing three pages. When you are ready to be-
gin, please click “Continue to Videos” below to
watch the video and then answer the following
questions about what you saw. The questions
will be divided into three pages, each containing
a separate video. You may take notes, and you
may pause, rewind, or replay the video as often
as you like. However, once you begin the test,
you may not exit out and come back, return to
the previous page, or refresh to repeat it.
Each page provided a video clip of a different scene that
used one randomly assigned video manipulation technique.
By the end, each participant had viewed one video clip from
each of the three scenes and each clip’s video manipulation
had been randomly assigned.
The video clips were followed by questions that asked the
participant to identify objects in the video. Each scene had
a different set of questions, based on the content of the scene.
The answers participants gave in response to those questions
in no way affected other scenes or questions in other scenes.
2.1.3 Control Videos and Privacy Expectations
The videos used in our experiment were captured from
the video stream of the Kinect sensor on a TurtleBot 2 [2]
that was navigated via teleoperation through a staged office
environment. Care was taken to ensure that all objects rel-
evant to the tasks were clearly visible at some point during
the videos. All videos used in our study are included in the
supplementary materials.
Three different video clips were designed to provide an
example of why each type of privacy might be pertinent.
Figure 3: This table shows the three different scenes
and their corresponding privacy types, tasks, and a
still image from the control video.
Figure 3 gives an overview of the privacy type and task for
each scene as well as a still image from the control video.
We describe each video scene below.
1. Electronic Valuables. This video clip explored the
office environment, passing some valuable items along
the way. A “Can’t tell” privacy type was applied to
the electronic valuables in this scene. In order of ap-
pearance, the valuables in the scene were a flat screen
television on a shelf, a desktop computer monitor in
the corner, and two ASUS laptops on chairs in the
middle of the room. For this scene, the proximal user
has specified that the remote user should not be able
to correctly identify the number of valuable items, but
instead should report viewing zero total valuables. Ad-
ditionally, the remote user should not be able to iden-
tify the locations of any valuable items nor any details
about them. In short, the remote user should not be
able to tell that these items exist in the room.
Survey Questions
• “How many computers or electronic valuables (cost-
ing more than $50) are there in the room?”
• “Name the valuables and the their locations in the
room.”
2. Hallway. This video clip recorded viewing out a door
into a hallway that contained one cardboard box in the
center. A “Can’t observe” privacy type was applied to
this scene. In this clip the proximal user has specified
that the user must not be able to see outside the room,
so the user was not allowed to see anything past the
open doorway into the hall. Although the cardboard
box was the object of interest, it was expected that the
user would not be able to see the cardboard box nor
anything else in the hallway.
Survey Questions
• “Could you see anything in the hallway? If so,
please list anything that you saw.”
3. Bookshelf. This video clip recorded viewing an of-
fice bookshelf, and particularly, the four books on the
bookshelf. A “Can’t discern” privacy type was ap-
plied to this scene. These four books on the bookshelf
were “ARToday,” “Visualization: The Second Com-
puter Revolution,” “Fifty Shades of Grey,” and “Twi-
light.” For this privacy expectation the proximal user
does not mind that the books are visible, but does not
want to reveal an affinity for embarrassing romance
novels. For this reason, the remote user is expected to
identify correctly that there are four books, but not be
able to read the titles of “Twilight” or “Fifty Shades of
Grey.” However, the user should still be able to identify
“ARToday” and “Visualization: The Second Computer
Revolution.”
Survey Questions
• “How many books are on the bookshelf?”
• “Name as many titles of the books as you can.”
2.1.4 Video Manipulation Independent Variable
All participants watched a video clip from each of the
three scenes, one for every privacy type. Each of the clips
was randomly assigned from the five video manipulations
that were applied to every scene. A total of 15 videos were
created: five distinct video manipulations (Redact, Replace,
Abstract, Blur, and the control) applied to each of the three
scenes (Electronic Valuables, Hallway, and Bookshelf). In
the manipulated video clips the objects that were filtered
were the four valuables (two laptops, one flat screen tele-
vision, and one desktop computer) in the Electronic Valu-
ables scene, the doorway in the Hallway scene, and the two
books (“Twilight” and “Fifty Shades of Grey”) in the Book-
shelf scene. Although multiple items may have been filtered
in one scene, all the filters were of the same type of video
manipulation within a single video clip. These video manip-
ulations were all applied using Adobe After Effects® on the
original control video.
2.1.5 Measures
Our primary measurement is the participants’ responses
to the survey questions. We also record the time that it took
for participants to answer all questions before going on to
the next page. We then coded the recorded answers based
on the privacy type.
Privacy Violations.
We measure the degree to which privacy was protected in
a distinct manner for each privacy condition, based on the
expectations for that type of privacy as described in Sec-
tion 2.1.3. For the Electronic Valuables scene, one privacy
violation was coded for each correctly identified valuable. In
the Hallway scene, the privacy violation was recorded if the
participant saw anything at all in the hallway. With the
Bookshelf scene, one privacy violation was coded for each
correctly identified filtered title (i.e. “Twilight” or “Fifty
Shades of Grey”). Although we had two separate researchers
code the data, the results presented are based on the princi-
ple coder’s findings. More detailed information on our cod-
ing scheme and inter-rater reliability is available in the sup-
plemental materials.
Additional Expectations.
Additionally, the user was expected to be able to iden-
tify the number of books and the titles of the two unflitered
books on the book shelf. With this privacy type the par-
ticipant should have recorded four books as the number of
books on the shelf. Participants were also expected to cor-
rectly identify two book titles, “ARToday” and “Visualiza-
tion: The Second Computer Revolution.”
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Privacy Violations
The privacy violations were analyzed and recorded in dif-
ferent ways for each privacy type, as explained above. Fig-
ure 4 shows the percentage of privacy violations that were
recorded on average for each privacy type based on the video
manipulation, and it shows the percentage of the total books
that participants recorded seeing based on video manipula-
tion. ANOVAs were used for each privacy type to determine
if there were any significant differences between the differ-
ent video manipulations, and from there Tukey’s method
was used for multiple comparisons with a 95% confidence
interval to determine which differences between video ma-
nipulations were significant (see Figure 5).
“Can’t tell”.
Abstract, control and blur had the highest average per-
centage of privacy violations for the “Can’t tell” privacy
condition, and the difference between these three was not
found to be significant. However, the drop in privacy viola-
tions between the blur and redact video manipulations was
significant. Redact and replace had the lowest percentage
of privacy violations on average, and the difference between
redact and replace was not significant.
“Can’t observe”.
The control video had the highest percentage of privacy
violations, and the difference between this and blur was sig-
nificant. No significant different was found between the blur
and abstract video manipulations. There was a significant
difference though between the blur and redact video manip-
ulations. Both redact and remove video manipulations had
the least amount of privacy violations with zero recorded
privacy violations, so no difference was found between them.
“Can’t discern”.
Although there were two possible privacy violations for
the “Can’t discern” privacy type, none of the video manipu-
lations averaged more than one privacy violation. The con-
trol and abstraction video manipulation had the highest per-
centage of total possible privacy violations and no significant
difference was found between the two. The blur video ma-
nipulation had only 6.25% of the total possible privacy vio-
lations accruing on average, and although redact and replace
recorded no privacy violations at all, there was no significant
difference found between these three video manipulations.
All three proved to work well to diminish privacy violations.
2.2.2 Additional Expectations
The “Can’t discern” privacy type also had expectations
aside from simply recording privacy violations. The results
for counting the number of books are shown in Figure 4.
The correct number of books on the bookshelf was four.
Users who saw the abstracted video recorded seeing 91%
of the total books on average, which was the closest any
group came to seeing all the books on the bookshelf. There
was no significant difference between this and the control
video. However, there was a significant difference between
Can't Tell Can't Observe Can't Discern Total Books Recorded
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Figure 4: Results for privacy violations and total books recorded. The first three charts show the average
percentage of privacy violations that occurred for each video manipulation. Each privacy type had a different
number of possible privacy violations: four for “Can’t tell,” one for “Can’t observe,” and two for “Can’t
discern.” The data shown illustrates the percentage of total possible privacy violations that occurred on
average for each video manipulation. The ideal percentage of privacy violations is always zero. The last
graph shows the average percentage of total books that were recorded for each video manipulation during
the Bookshelf scene. There were four books total, and the ideal percentage of total books recorded is 100%.
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Figure 5: Significant Difference Groupings. Using Tukey’s method for multiple comparisons with a 95%
confidence interval, these tables show the groupings showing significant differences. Video manipulations
within the same letter group are not significantly different from each other, while video manipulations with
no shared letter groupings are significantly different from each other. Video manipulations with two letter
groupings are not significantly different from either of the two letter groups they belong to.
the control and the blur video manipulations. The differ-
ences between the blur and redact video manipulations and
the redact and replace video manipulations were not signifi-
cant, yet there was a significant difference between the blur
and replace video manipulations.
Accuracy in identifying the two unflitered books titles was
analyzed, but no significant difference was found between
the different video manipulations on correctly identifying
the two titles (F4,110 = 1.54, p > .05). Therefore this mea-
surement cannot be used to conclude in any way that one
video manipulation is better than another in upholding this
expectation of the “Can’t discern” privacy type.
2.2.3 Time
Although time spent was analyzed, no significant infor-
mation was revealed in analyzing the data through ANOVA.
The difference in time spent for each privacy condition among
the different video manipulations was insignificant (F4,100 =
1.94, p > .05) and the standard deviations for these aver-
age times were disproportionately large. Therefore, it was
concluded that no significance could be gathered from an-
alyzing the recorded times it took participants to complete
each section of the study.
2.3 Analysis
The data we collected supports our hypothesis that the
given privacy types can be upheld through the use of video
manipulations (H1). In analyzing the results we discuss each
privacy type separately to better consider the full signifi-
cance of all the recorded results.
2.3.1 Can’t Tell
A fair number of privacy violations were recorded even for
the redact and replace filters, which were the two video ma-
nipulation techniques with the lowest averages. There were
many factors that could have led participants to correctly
identify more valuables in the scene, but the two most sig-
nificant were that the environment made it easy to infer the
identification of valuables and the valuables were not well
defined. Although the valuable items themselves may have
been filtered, other related items (e.g. cords from laptops,
CPU attached to desktop computer monitor, speakers sur-
rounding television) were not filtered and could be clearly
identified around the filtered areas. The other issue was that
there seemed to be confusion on what the valuables to be
recorded really were, and participants would often record
objects from the scene that had not been meant to be la-
beled as electronic valuables. This was true across the dif-
ferent video manipulations, including those who had viewed
the control clip. The fact that control also encountered this
problem shows that it was a flaw in the study design and
not an effect of the filters. For these reason, the number of
total valuables recorded was not analyzed.
Although one might hypothesize that replace would be sig-
nificantly more useful in hiding an object completely from
the screen and making it seem as though the object was
never there, the data does not support that, since no signif-
icant difference was found between replace and redact video
manipulations. Despite this, we concluded that the replace
video manipulation had best upheld this privacy type and its
expectations because in their responses, participants never
made mention that something was being taken out of the pic-
ture. However, with the redact video manipulation, it was
obvious from some responses that the black boxes alerted the
participant that something was there, even if it was unclear
what that object was. A snippet from a typical response
exemplifies this problem: “it looked like 2 laptops on chairs
blocked by black squares.” We did not have any questions
to tease out how many participants noticed that there were
objects being filtered out, so all we can rely on are the free-
form responses. From those answers, we can conclude that
replace would be a better choice for the “Can’t tell” privacy
type than redact.
2.3.2 Can’t Observe
Redact and replace completely upheld this privacy expec-
tation since neither allowed any user to describe anything
in the hallway. While both appear to work equally well, in
practice the proximal user might be inclined to choose one
over the other based upon which manipulated video they
find more appealing or realistic.
Although our results did not appear to be skewed, there
was a discrepancy in the replace video manipulation that
was used during the Hallway scene. In all other video clips
the filters were placed over the entire door frame to fully
block out the hallway. However, in using the replace video
manipulation a filter was placed only over the cardboard
box. Our main concern with this was that there might be
more privacy violations since participants could still mention
other details about the hallway (e.g. the stairs, banister,
exit sign). Since no privacy violations occurred, it can be
deduced that replacing only the box was enough to take
attention away from the hallway, even though the question
asked about it directly.
It is also hypothesized that if the filter had been placed
over the entire doorway the view through the doorway would
not have been as clear and understandable. It is likely that
the replace video manipulation would have given the ap-
pearance that there was a second door, and the user may
have been confused by what they saw in the image. For
this reason, a redact video manipulation would be prefer-
able because it gives an obvious cue to the user that there
is something beyond the doorway, but they are not allowed
to view it.
2.3.3 Can’t Discern
Blur was not significantly different than redact or replace,
but it did allow some privacy violations. One possible reason
for this could be due to the intensity of the blur filter. It
is possible that a blur filter with a higher intensity would
better protect the titles of the novels. Another factor that
played a role in identifying the filtered books was the fame
and notoriety associated with these particular books. With
their iconic cover art, it is possible the participant could
deduce which book was being filtered out as long as they
could still get a sense of what the illustration on the cover
looked like even if they could not read the title.
As far as privacy violations are concerned it is clear from
our results that the blur, redact, and replace video manip-
ulations work best at making privacy violations impossible.
However, the “Can’t discern” privacy type also expects that
the user can still correctly identify the quantity of books on
the shelf, including the filtered books. Not surprisingly, it
seems that the more privacy violations that the video manip-
ulation had on average, the better the video manipulation
also did with correctly identifying the number of books on
the shelf. It is important to note that in correctly recording
the total number of books blur did do better than replace
and redact, although not significantly. This indicates that
blur may be better at balancing awareness and privacy pro-
tection. The replace filter had the lowest average number
of books recorded on the shelf, which leads us to conclude
that it may not be effective enough in giving the remote user
the necessary awareness of the scene. At the same time, the
redact filter is lacking in privacy protection because it does
not have as subtle of an appearance as replace or blur. One
can hypothesize that using a redact filter might draw un-
wanted attention to the region that is to be indiscernible,
while a blur filter could be written off as simply bad video
quality and would not be as alarming or confusing as a black
box that block’s the user’s view. For this reason, we recom-
mend using a blur filter, over redact or replace, for “Can’t
discern” privacy types.
The case for redact in this video clip is also very unique in
that the boxes used to redact the books from the bookshelf
were a very similar color to the bookshelf itself. This led
to an effect that looked quite similar, although not identi-
cal, to replace. Perhaps if the boxes used had been a color
such as red that created a greater contrast against the back
drop of the bookshelf, or if the bookshelf itself had been
a bright color to contrast with the boxes used for redact-
ing, the results would more likely show a greater difference
between results for the replace and redact video manipula-
tions. Also, the shape of the boxes was similar enough to the
shape of a standard book that it could be deduced that the
boxes were hiding books as well. Varying the shapes of the
redaction filter used could lead to less participants viewing
the box as a representation for the book.
3. TASK PERFORMANCE STUDY
Our study presented in Section 2 showed that certain
video manipulation techniques can be used to uphold pri-
vacy expectations. However, the overall effectiveness of such
a technique could be negated if its use prevents or signifi-
cantly incumbers the ability of the remote user to accom-
plish a given task. The aim of the study presented in this
secton is to examine how the use of these privacy-protecting
techniques impacts task performance.
3.1 Method
This study uses an independent-measures design with one
control group and one experimental group. Participants
were asked to teleoperate a mobile robot through an un-
familiar home environment and to respond to a brief set of
survey questions asking them to identify cleaning supplies
and equipment contained in the home. For the experimen-
tal group, the environment was physically modified to hide
any evidence of children in the home. After completing the
task of identifying cleaning supplies, participants were asked
whether or not they believed that children regularly visit this
home.
3.1.1 Participants
30 participants were recruited through flyers distributed
via email and posted on bulletin boards in the local com-
munity. Participants were compensated ten dollars for their
participation. Participants were told that they would be ex-
pected to, “drive a robot around an apartment and answer
a brief set of survey questions.” The average time spent
per participant, including training and answering all survey
questions, was between 30-45 minutes.
Basic demographic information was collected for each par-
ticipant. 12 males and 18 females participated in the study.
The mean age of the participants was 28. 33% of the par-
ticipants were students, and 30% of the participants played
video games more than once a month. Only one of the par-
ticipants reported any familiarity with the apartment build-
ing in which the home environment was staged, and zero
expressed an expert level of familiarity with robots or other
remotely operated devices.
3.1.2 Procedure
Participants were asked to teleoperate a TurtleBot 2 using
a PS3 joystick through an unfamiliar home environment.
Participants sat at a table with two laptops. One laptop
showed a full screen live video feed from the robot. The other
laptop was used for displaying a web page that provided the
instructions to the participant and allowed them to answer
the survey questions. The participants were provided with a
manually drawn floor plan of the apartment that they would
be moving the robot through, but they were never allowed
to see this space with their own eyes. They only observed
the space through the video feed from the robot.
Before the experiment began, participants were given a
brief training session on teleoperating the TurtleBot. They
were asked to use the joystick to drive a TurtleBot that was
in the room with them. After gaining some initial familiarity
with the controls, they were asked to navigate around an
obstacle without looking at the robot, but only looking at
the video feed on the laptop screen.
Once the training was completed successfully, participants
were presented with the following prompt:
You work for a Home Cleaning Agency, and a
new customer is asking what it would cost for
your company to have someone come in and clean
part of his home. To give him your best estimate
of what it would cost, you would like to take a
look around his home, and he has allowed you
to do this through the use of his home robot.
You will be able to operate it remotely and see
through a live video what the house looks like.
Your task is to take an inventory of the cleaning
supplies and equipment including their locations
and if possible their brands.
Your company gives a discount to customers who
have their own cleaning supplies and equipment
that they allow the company to use. This cuts
down on costs since the company does not need
to bring extra supplies or use up their own re-
sources. We have included instructions and ques-
tions to help you identify if there are any cleaning
supplies and equipment that this customer owns
and may allow the cleaning company to use.
Participants were then instructed to navigate first to the
kitchen and then to the living room and to identify any
cleaning supplies and equipment that they found there, in-
cluding their specific locations and brand names. The clean-
ing supplies included Bon Ami cleaning powder, Dawn dish
soap, Pine Sol floor cleaner, and Bounty paper towels in the
kitchen, and a Dirt Devil vacuum cleaner and a dust pan
and brush in the living room.
After completion of the task, a post-survey was adminis-
tered that included the following question:
Based on what you saw, to what degree do you
agree with the following statement:
Children regularly visit this apartment.
[Strongly disagree, Disagree, Niether agree nor
disagree, Agree, Strongly agree]
3.1.3 Privacy Protection Independent Variable
Each participant was randomly assigned to the control or
experimental group. All participants completed the same
task as described in Section 3.1.2. The only difference was
that for participants in the experimental group, the envi-
ronment was physically modified to hide any evidence of
children in the home.
Evidence that might convey that children were regularly
in the home included an umbrella stroller in the kitchen, toys
in the living room, family photos on the coffee table in the
living room, a baby gate in the doorway to the bedroom, and
a walker toy in the bedroom. For the experimental group,
appropriate techniques were applied to hide these pieces of
evidence. The specific techniques were chosen based on the
results from our video manipulation study (see Section 2)
and applied physically to the environment, rather than in
software, in order to ensure that no shortcoming of the soft-
ware implementation would impact our results. The privacy
expectations and the techniques used to satisfy those expec-
tations are described below.
• A “Can’t tell” privacy type was applied to the toys
in the living room and the stroller in the kitchen. To
mimic a perfect replace filter, these items were re-
moved from the environment.
• A “Can’t observe” privacy type was applied to the
bedroom. To mimic a perfect redact filter, a black bed
sheet was hung over the bedroom doorway.
• A “Can’t discern” privacy type was applied to the
family photos on the coffee table. To mimic a perfect
blur filter, the photos in the picture frames were re-
placed with copies that had been blurred using image
editing software.
Photographs of the home environment and videos from
the user study are provided in 6.
3.1.4 Measures
Our primary data is the participants’ responses to the
survey questions. We also recorded all the sensor data from
the robot, including the video stream, and we recorded audio
of the participant talking aloud while completing the tasks.
Task Performance.
The participant’s task was to identify cleaning supplies in
the apartment. Participants were presented with a list of
12 cleaning supplies and asked to check boxes next to the
items that they found in the apartment. For each partici-
pant, we recorded the number of correctly identified cleaning
supplies. We also recorded the number of incorrectly identi-
fied cleaning supplies, i.e., cleaning supplies checked on the
list that were not actually present in the apartment.
For each cleaning supply identified, the participant was
also asked to give its specific location in the apartment as
well as its brand name. We recorded the number of correctly
identified locations and brands.
Privacy Violation.
As part of the post-survey questions, participants were
asked to what degree they agreed with the statement that
children regularly visit the apartment on a 5-point Likert
scale. As the privacy goal was to hide any evidence of chil-
dren in the home, we use the participant response to this
question as a measure of the degree to which privacy was or
was not violated.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Task Performance
A boxplot of the numbers of correctly identified clean-
ing supplies is shown in Figure 7. According to a Fisher’s
exact test (p = 0.763), there was no significant difference
between the number of correctly identified cleaning supplies
by participants in the control condition (mean of 5.13) and
participants in the experimental condition (mean of 5.33).
Furthermore, there was also no significant difference found
between the two conditions for the mean number of incor-
rectly identified supplies (0.13 control, 0.07 experimental),
mean number of correctly identified locations (2.27 control,
2.40 experimental), or mean number of correctly identified
brands (4.73 control, 4.40 experimental). These results pro-
vide support for H2.
3.2.2 Privacy Violation
A boxplot of the scores on a 5-point Likert scale in re-
sponse to the statement that children regularly visited the
apartment is shown in Figure 8. According to a Welch’s t-
test (p < 0.001), participants in the control condition (mean
score of 3.86) agreed significantly more with the statement
that children regularly visited the apartment than partic-
ipants in the experimental condition (mean score of 2.13)
where privacy-protecting techniques were applied. This re-
sult provides support for H1.
3.3 Analysis
We studied the impact of privacy-protecting techniques on
task performance in remote presence systems. The results
showed that the use of these privacy-protecting techniques
did lead to fewer violations of privacy expectations without
lowering task performance.
3.3.1 Task Performance
Participants were charged with the task of identifying
cleaning supplies. There were 6 supplies in the apartment,
and participants in both conditions correctly identified a lit-
tle above 5 supplies on average. By far, the most common
mistake among participants in both conditions was omit-
ting the dust pan and brush. This item was more difficult
to identify due to its location under the coffee table. Con-
sequently, of the three places where supplies were located,
this was also the most commonly omitted location.
Of the 6 supplies, all but the dust pan and brush had a
brand name. The brand name of the Dawn dish soap was
the most difficult to read, and this was the brand that was
most commonly missed by participants in both conditions.
(a) 
(d) 
(f) 
(c) 
(e) 
(b) 
Figure 6: Photographs of the home environment. Cleaning supplies in the living room included a vacuum
cleaner (a) and a dust pan and brush under the coffee table (b). For the experimental group, a sheet was
used to black out the bedroom (c), the toys were removed, and the family photographs were blurred (d).
Additional cleaning supplies and a stroller were in the kitchen (e), and a baby gate and walker toy were in
the bedroom (f).
Figure 7: Boxplot of the number of correctly iden-
tified cleaning supplies, by condition.
Occasionally, this difficulty caused a participant to misiden-
tify the supply as a bottle of bleach, rather than dish soap.
No participant in either condition listed a location or brand
that was not actually present.
3.3.2 Privacy Violation
Using the privacy-protecting techniques did lead to fewer
violations of privacy expectations, and this effect may be
even more pronounced than we were able to measure. Of
the 15 participants in the control condition, only 3 disagreed
with the statement that children regularly visited the apart-
ment. Interestingly, 2 of these participants seem to have
clicked the wrong button because when asked to justify their
answer, they gave reasons such as “stroller in the kitchen,
toys in the living room.” Similarly, the one and only partic-
ipant in the experimental group that agreed with the state-
ment did so because, “The apartment is really clean, I could
not see any family pictures or toys around.”
4. DISCUSSION
We have conducted two user studies to examine the pro-
tection of privacy in remote presence systems. The results
imply that video manipulation techniques are effective in ob-
scuring details to protect privacy expectations. Based on our
analysis of the collected data, we recommend using a replace
video manipulation technique for “Can’t tell” privacy types,
a redact video manipulation technique for “Can’t observe”
privacy types, and a blur video manipulation technique for
“Can’t discern” privacy types. Furthermore, multiple tech-
niques can be used simultaneously to uphold different pri-
vacy expectations without impacting the remote user’s abil-
ity to perform a task.
Limitations.
In the video manipulation study each scene was manip-
Figure 8: Boxplot of the scores on a 5-point Lik-
ert scale in response to the statement that children
regularly visited the apartment, by condition.
ulated using all five video manipulations, but there was
only one scene used for each privacy type. To help gen-
eralize these findings, one could experiment with different
conditions (e.g. lighting condition, number of objects/focal
points in a scene, settings or calibrations for the video ma-
nipulations) to create more video clips and better analyze
which video manipulation would be most appropriate for
most scenes that attempt to uphold a certain privacy type.
There are also other kinds of video manipulations that
were not used in this study that could be used and tested
to see if they would do any better with upholding certain
privacy types. Even the video manipulation techniques used
in this study could be modified further to better uphold
privacy, such as using a stronger blur filter or a more robust
inpainting technique for the replace filter. This study also
made mention of how some video manipulations might be
preferable for certain privacy types due to the appearance
they gave to the remote user, and further investigation could
be done to examine which type the proximal user prefers to
show the remote user when multiple video manipulations are
equally effective in protecting privacy.
In the task performance study we observed our results
in one environment, with one robot, one task, one set of
privacy expectations, and one set of techniques to uphold
them. For this reason, we can only speculate about the gen-
eralizability of our observation that using privacy-protecting
techniques reduces privacy violations without reducing task
performance. There are certainly scenarios where this may
not be the case, or where different techniques may be needed.
Another limitation of this study is that we implemented
the techniques by physically altering the environment, rather
than manipulating the live video stream in software. Indeed,
this was an intentional part of our design, in order to avoid
any effects that might be due to limitations of the software
system. We also minimized the effects of network lag by
putting the robot and the machine used to teleoperate it on
the same local wireless network. Our goal in this study was
to remove such potentially confounding variables, but these
are important concerns that will need to be addressed in a
real-world system.
5. CONCLUSION
Manipulations of the video stream can be used to pro-
tect some of the observational privacy concerns raised by
the use of remote presence systems. Certain video manipu-
lation techniques are more effective than others for specifc
privacy types: replace for “Can’t tell”, redact for “Can’t ob-
serve”, and blur for “Can’t discern”. These manipulations
can be used in concert with one another to protect a given
set of privacy expectations without interfering with the re-
mote user’s ability to accomplish a task.
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APPENDIX
A. CODING SCHEME
To make sense of the recorded data we received it was nec-
essary that the data be sorted and categorized, particularly
into which answers should be recorded as privacy violations
and which should not. As the data was analyzed guidelines
were put into place on which responses would be considered
privacy violations and which would not. In the rare cases
where answers were completely unintelligible or could not
be classified, the response was ommitted.
For the “Can’t tell” privacy type, privacy violations were
recorded for any correct identification of one of the four valu-
ables. Between the two coders, there was a .84 inter-rater
reliability as based on Cohen’s κ. One privacy violation was
recorded for any mention of a television or LED screen. An-
other one privacy violation was recorded for any mention
of a desktop computer, computer, or CPU. Up to two pri-
vacy violations were recorded for any mention of laptops or
personal computers. The number of privacy violations for
laptops was dependent on the number of laptops mentioned
in the recorded text, and then further relied upon the to-
tal number of valuables recorded when the text was unclear.
The ideal number of privacy violations is zero for this privacy
type. It is important to note that any mention of a moni-
tor was not counted as a privacy violation for the television,
but was recorded as a privacy violation for the desktop if
no other mention of the desktop was made. Also, many of
the responses had more items listed than the valuables that
were considered privacy violations. A frequent object listed
was the desktop/monitor/computer/laptop on the far left
that was actually just a painting on a shelf leaning against
a wall.
In the “Can’t observe” privacy condition scenario, data
was recorded about what, if anything, participants could
see down a hallway. Among the different coders, there was
a .94 inter-rater reliability as based on Cohen’s κ. Most typ-
ically a privacy violation was recorded when any mention of
the cardboard box was made. This box was also referred to
several times as something being made of wood, a carton,
and a package. An atypical response that was considered a
privacy violation was the rare instance where the stairs were
heavily implied in the recorded response when the partici-
pant mentioned that this was recorded on the second floor
of a house. Since this answer demonstrated that the partic-
ipant must have taken note of the stairs, which are in the
hallway, we considered this a privacy violation.
There were a good deal of commonly recorded items that
were not seen as privacy violations since they were not lo-
cated in the hallway, but rather inside the room: a chair,
folding tables, a door stopper, the door itself, and the car-
pet. It is important to note that any mention of a door was
interpreted as a reference to the main wooden door that
opens to the hallway. It was unclear whether any of the re-
sponses were referring to the door shape that could be seen
at the end of the hallway, and due to the lack of specificity
in responses it was determined that there was a greater like-
lihood that participants would have been referring to the
wooden door.
Another pertinent detail in recording privacy violations
was that we did not consider any mention of a black box as
a privacy violation when the redact video manipulation was
being used because the assumption was made that this was
referring to the filter instead of the cardboard box. This
black box was also referred to as a black mass, black screen,
and stone. While rare, there were a good number of items
that were identified in participants answers that could not be
traced back to anything in the video clip. Examples include
an inverted cup, a glass bowl, a sofa, and a metallic button,
and none of these were considered privacy violations since
they did not exist or resemble anything that did exist in the
hallway.
With video clips concerning the “Can’t discern” privacy
type, a privacy violation was recorded once for any mention
of “Twilight” and once for any mention of “Fifty Shades of
Grey.” There was a .98 inter-rater reliability as based on
Cohen’s κ. It should be noted that spelling did not have to
be exact, but rather as long as the title was fairly close or
had any of the main words from the title (i.e. “fifty”“shades”
“grey”“twilight”) the privacy violation was recorded. How-
ever, there was a unique case where a participant incorrectly
identified a title as “Breaking Dawn,” which is another novel
in the“Twilight”saga, and this was not recorded as a privacy
violation because the title was clearly a guess and incorrect
at that. In assessing accuracy in reading the unfiltered titles
a correctly identified book title was recorded for any men-
tion or relatively close spelling to “ARToday” and another
was recorded for any mention of any of the words in the ti-
tle or relatively close spellings to“Visualization: The Second
Computer Revolution.” For title accuracy, there was a .98
inter-rater reliability as based on Cohen’s κ.
